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Book review: Paul Erickson: The World the Game Theorists Made. The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2015. 390 pp. ISBN 978-0-226-09703-9 (cloth), 978-0-226-09717-6 (paper), 978-0-226-
09720-6 (e-book), DOI: 10.7208/Chicago/9780226097206.001.0001.1 
The World the Game Theorists Made is a carefully-researched history of game theory, and an 
ambitious project: Erickson’s aim is to provide a unifying narrative of more than 50 years of game 
theory following the publication of von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior. The second chapter (after an introductory overview) contains the genesis and a 
synopsis of this seminal work, and the following five chapters the subsequent development of game 
theory, its main players, and its embedding not only in the history of science but also in the cultural 
environment moulded mainly by Cold War-America. As such, it is the most extensive history of game 
theory and game theoretical thinking available to date, and goes beyond the often found and 
mutually disconnected accounts of the long history of probability and games of chance, of the role 
game theory played in the Cold War era, or of how evolutionary theory entered the stage in the 
development of a theory of social interaction without rationality. Erickson’s book has all of this, and 
gives credible explanations of the links between the different fields and concerns game theorists 
were drawn to deal with. 
 
The unifying narrative Erickson offers is that game theory’s enduring success is to be explained 
through the fact that it provides (quite heterogeneous) mathematical tools flexible enough to figure 
in a wide range of social scientific themes and models and which, although quite heterogeneous, 
nevertheless “knit them together into a common conversation” (p. 14). Moreover, whereas the 
formal core was essentially preserved, its semantics was subject to various shifts following the focus 
of the theory. Perhaps the most prominent example of such a reinterpretation is the evolutionary 
perspective on equilibrium selection. 
This narrative is able to explain why the history of game theory is full of promises and setbacks from 
its beginning. For example, Erickson observes that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s opus did not 
have an obvious audience: too applied for mathematicians, and too mathematical for economists, it 
nevertheless contained the appealing promise that a unifying explanation of the social sciences can 
eventually be found in the mathematics of the strategic interaction of rational agents. This promise 
was enthusiastically adopted in evolving Cold War-America and its numerous military-sponsored 
research programmes.  
What is more, according to Erickson, the development and success story of game theory was partly 
caused by the political will of early Cold War-America, where a great part of the basic research in 
game theory was demanded and paid for by military and semi-governmentally funded organisations 
such as the RAND corporation – whereas classical research in academic institutions was sparse, 
mainly because the game theorists’ work did not fit well in the academic division of labour. The very 
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core of game theory (e.g. the interpretation of rationality; its common notation and language) was 
established through basic research thus financed. Erickson’s explanation of how Cold War demand 
and funding shaped the theory may give the reader pause. It seems this concerns less the world the 
game theorists made, and more what the world made of game theory. 
 
And this leads us to the downside of this important and commendable book. The reader can’t help 
getting the impression that Erickson considers the emergence and survival of game theory 
essentially as a historical accident (admittedly, Erickson wouldn’t express it this grossly), made 
possible through Cold War zeitgeist. This comes together with an uncritical US-centrism. The “other 
side of the curtain” is not even mentioned except as the unspecified opponent in the zero-sum game 
of Cold War (nor are now important centres outside the US mentioned, such as the Center for the 
Study of Rationality at Hebrew University); and the possibility that there was independent research 
going on among USSR scholars does not figure in the book. But think of results such as the now 
famous Bondareva-Shapley theorem for the non-emptiness of the core, of which Lloyd Shapley 
himself said it was a "simple derivation of a theorem of Bondareva" (On Balanced Sets and Cores 
(1967), p. 453). So there seems to have even been exchange between American and Russian game 
theorists, and evidence abounds confirming this, such as the 1968 compilation of English translations 
Selected Russian Papers on Game Theory 1959-1965, with a preface by Oscar Morgenstern (!). In it, 
Morgenstern writes: "Game theorists are aware of considerable interest in game theory that has 
developed in the Soviet Union over the last years. ... [The following papers] will immediately prove 
the high quality of work done in the Soviet Union and they should stimulate further publication of 
translations" (p. i). 
Erickson’s complete silence in his new book seems to be a development of the attitude taken in  
another book he co-authored, the 2013 How reason almost lost its mind: the strange career of cold 
war rationality. Here the authors explicitly restrict the analysis to the US and treat the USSR ”only as 
the imagined player across the chessboard, as it did for the American participants in the Cold War 
rationality debates” (pp. 20-21). So they at least mention the other side of the Iron Curtain when 
they talk about the reception of game theory, albeit in a disregarding manner; for example, “… the 
Soviet response [to Theory of Games and Economic Behavior] was belated, circumscribed, and 
comparatively tepid” (p. 18).  
Given this, it may be conjectured that Erickson did not feel the need to even mention game theory in 
the USSR in his new book any more. But once it is granted that there were other centres of interest 
and research in game theory, the picture Erickson gives might need revision. In particular, the thesis 
that the evolution of game theory was a historical accident may lose its plausibility: the development 
of the theory might have been more stable than Erickson claims it is. This would be an interesting 
question to consider. 
 
To conclude, Erickson does not entirely deliver on the promise to provide an integrated history of 
game theory and game theoretical thinking. As an extensive monograph of the rich history of game 
theory in North America, I consider this to be an important work recommended to anyone 
interested in the evolution of game theory and its entanglements with the postwar political 
establishment, its mutual influence with the social sciences, and its major players. 
